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The Des ign of In centive C o m pe nsa lio n ror Directo r s

Chun-Keung Hoi and Ashok Robm'

• HOI IS an Aswc,"le Professor or Pmaoce 'nd Robin is a Professor of Finance at the College of
BUSiness oF thc Rochester lnsuune oFTeehoo\ogy
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Abst ract

Today. moSI firms provide equity-based Ineenllve eo mlXn.a1lon to thcn non-execut,,'e direc tors,
We summarize viewpoints s upport,,'e and critic al of thrs development. We argue thaI the
effect iwness of incent;ve compcnSJllOn IS relaled to the struClure of the mcenllve pay contact.
We doscuss!he usc of op tions and shares as well as the Issue of whether mcem",'c pay sho uld be
~eared

towa rd "UTTen l rewards or future Lt\C entlve.' , We also d,s cms the cnllcat ISSUe of

mamtalnlng lhe ownershIp exposure of direc tors by providmg suffiCIent levels of eq u;ty as wcl l
as placing re stnelions on cashing out. Using OUT argun'lems above, we suggest glllde line' for
c(lnSlruclin g an opllma l eonlract. lVe c"mpare 289 ", cenl i"C pla ns offered by p ublic compames
m the US dunng 1988-1998 ami find that plans ucv late Slgm ti cantly from the opllmum,
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T he Design o f Ince n t ive Co m pe nsa tio n fo r Directo r s

I

In 1989. the board of Ge neral Eleemc Corponlllon (GE) voted to ofTer stock opllo ns to us non-

I

execunve directors (hereafler, simply d Lfcetors) . For the first llme, GE d,rectors would have
their ann ual compe nsatio[\ directly tied to their <hareholders' fortunes. Dlrecto" were glYC." an
annUllI o ption grant of up to 1,500 shares wIth an exerelse price equal to the prevailing share
pflce. The opllons were exercisable m four cqual annual msrallmcnts and cxplred

In

10 years.

Interestingly. the annual option grant was designed as an addition to an already competitive
compensation package eomaLn,ng an annual reta iner of$25,000 Jnd a fcc of$I ,200 per
GE waS in thc

van~uard

m~'<:tmg,

of the move to offer stock options to d"""tors. In a 1992

Conference Board survey of large eorpora!Lons III the UnLlcd Slates, only 45% of the companlcs
sun..,yed repo ned 10 have tncluded some slocks m almua! compensation for dllc"'lors,

In

contrast, m a SI milar sun'ey in 1997, more than 80% of the firm. offered SOmC form of equity ·
based compen sation to their d lfeClolO , What is k hmd this phcnomt."on? Why are so many US
finn s j umping on this bandwagon'! Whatissues should fin ns consider when o ffenng mcenll\'<
pay to their directors'!
Our paper has the fo llowing obJeclL,," s. We summJnze the preVJ llmg arguments and
anecdotal evidence on director incemlve pay using both academic and bu,mcss sources, Wl' thcn
ldentify practic al implementatIon ISsues concernmg the destgn of dirl'<:tor Ineentlvc
compensalion arrangcments and provide evidence on the current stale of such practices by
repomng on 289 plans adopted by US firms dun ng the period 1988· 1998.
Why Usc Incco tiw Co mp en ,at ion for

No n- £ ,~ ",' u t i "e

Olrectors ?

We define d,rector Lncentive co mpensation as the u", of stocks, stock option" and other
equ ity-based com perlsalion as all imegral pan of thc direclo r's compensa tion package . Pro" iding
finatJqal Incentives 10 dtreCiOO can encour age dr5lfable behavior such as active mon;1Oring of

roanagerial decis,ons, Michael

Jen~

states the followmg m hIS Presidential Address to the

American Financial Assoc iation '0 199) (Jensen. 1'i9):
Boards should ha ve an 'mplieit undersmndmg or exph cll requncmem tha i new
members must invest in the stock of the company. While the lmhal m\'estmcm
cou ld vary. It should seldom be less than $100,000 fj-om the new board
member' s personal f"n ds, this investment would force new board members to
rceogIllzc from the outset that their deCISions affect their own wealth as well as
that o f remote Shareholders. Over the long term the mwstment ean be made
much largcr by options or stock·based , ompens.allon, 'me [eC~."t trend to pay
some board member fees In stock or opno", is a move In lhe right dire,tlon,
Discouraging board members Irom "' llmg IhlS equny IS Important SO that
holdings will .ccumulate to a significant Sl2C over lime,
The main element of the dirc<:tor pay plan advocated by Jensen IS thaI a subSllont,,1
amount of a director ' s wealth is pUt at risk. Jensen argues that newly ap[l<llllted d" octors

~hould

Inve~t

~hould

a minimum o f $100. 000 on equity usi"g

~rSQ"1l1

flmds. In additio n, compJIlIes

onable directors to build on this initial equity investment by compensat ing them with eqully based mstru mcnts in lieo of the usual ann ual cosh retainer.

These sequential aelions w,11

encourage di m:tors to aecum ulatc signific ant cquil}' ove r t ime and gene rate 'ownership
eX[l<lsure.

However. dlreetors eJn

~ountera~t

and reduce ownership exposure by Iiquid Jtll1g

thetr equity [l<lw ;ons Direct ors Can also u:;c financial derivatives such as (p ut) "p tion., as risk
manage ment touls to rcduce th<:lr ",,"ership cxpos ure, Therefor e, a key deSign feature of an
etTcetlw di" e(or mccntlvc plsn is the imposition of rcstrictions on salt of the equity mstruments
awarde<!. Furth, rm,x c. directors should also be constrained from using financlal dem" tlws

to

reduce their o,,"erShlp expos ure,
With these sequential and , omplemcntary steps. dircctor compensauon can be an
effective teet

to

align the interests of di...,<: tors and shareholdcrs. Thc Nalional Association o f

Corporate Directors (NACO . 1995) supports thIS poSition , In the 1995 BI",~ Ribbrm Commission
Report

Oil

Direclor Cu mpe"'iI1liOll. the NACD prup<1ses "boards should pJY direl'lors so lely in

th, form of stock and cash

on

with «J uity represennng a substanl1 JI portion of the lolal up to

5

1000/. "

Whilc Jenscn defincs an initial Icvel ho ld ing of at Icast S t 00,000, the NACD suggests

an eventual target o f $600,000 for directors of l arg~ companL~S.
The idca of provid ing dil"<'ctors WIth equ lly-based incetllives
nK'anmgfu l IFel of o"''tlers hip cxlXlSurC has

~alncd

SQ

that they can allam a

widesprcad acceptancc in thc US

Sharcholder interes t groups m pameular tend to concur with th,s prcsenption. Two mflucnnal
pension funds, T1AA-eREF and Califomia Publie Employces '
suppo rt the idea that di rectors ShOllld maintain a minimllm

R~t i rel ne nt

System (CAL-PERS),

own~rsh ip I~vel

in the company' s

stock (Koppes, 1996), For instance. CALPERS advocates that at least 50% of the director' s tota l
compen,ation should be '" company Stock..

Ca""" 1 Emptor: Boes h'ccnth'c r a}' fo r l)irectors I' ro" id e Incem;'·cs': Or Is It Pa ~'orr:
DirtttOT pay eonlain s inccntlVes Ir the amount o r the COmpensallOn ;s strOllgly linked to
finn pcrfonnance and if th<:re is a substa ntial petlalty for pom nrm !X'rfonnan ce. If thi, were the
case , drrccrors art motivated to increase ti rm ..aluc. The downside or penalty is Bermcal featllre
of an mcent;-'e conlr.lel. This IS thc reaSOn why Jensl'n and others stress that plans should p ut
director wealth at risk and generJ.te o \\nership exposure.
On the othcr hand, d,rector pay can provide
if nrm perfo rmance IS weak.

~ on , i dcr a b l c

eompc'nsation lu directors c"en

A pavolI plan can arise when sufficie nt !>Cnalties for P:Q:Ql:

!K"rform;mce 00 nol ex lSl and/or whcn a

dlfc~ lQI

is nol rC<l uiti:d 10 rnam1ain

owp ~rffii p

CX!l()wre,

An exa mple of a plan wuh an insuffiCient penalty" one where stock opnons With an exercise
price close to zer o a rc gi"en to d,rectors

tn this casc, the eom!X'nsatlon obtained rrom stock

oplLons will alnmst always be positiw , and thc d Lreetors will be nposed to no dou-ns,dc, Thu s,
there a rc substanti al rewa rds ewn for poor

pcrforrna n~e .

PayolT plans can also be plans that

provide d irectors Subslantla l fiex,b,ltly to red uce thclf ownership expos"re. For Lnstance, when
shares wnh w ry short vtstmlr pcn oJ s (I.e" the period in which shares cannot be sold) are gIVen
to dm,etor:s, the direc tors can qULckly cash Ollt of their posrnon s.

Such plnns arc counter·

6

prod uctive because once dir ecto rs have cashed oUl the mcenllves nO longer exist.

It 's

quest ionabk whether a payoff plan can benefil shareholders.
Graef S. CrysllIl. a noted a uthor on CEO compensanon. weIghed in On thIs subJcct. In a
\99 1 Fortu ne amclc (Cryst al, 1991). Cryslal questions' "0 0 directors cam lheir kcep?"
Analyzmg a sample of 104 large" Fortune SUO and Sen 'lce 500 compames, Cryslal found thai
finns do not use slock option grants 10 o' ....eOm" an under..;;ompct'livc k "d of eompensa tlon for
the,r direc tors . Rather, lhey added lhese stock-based comp<mcnts on top of already com pet itive
le ~els

of compcnsalion resulting m an ine,"ase in 101.1 director wmpensation,

While this

ob""'rvation may be dated. it is consisrer u wllh lhe more recent lrend reponed by Investor
Respo nsibility Research Ccntcr (Bertsch. 1998). Stud}'ing the Standard & Poor's Super 500
firms in 1997, the IRRC report suggests that directors' annual cash wmpen sation has been
essenn.lIy stabl.- for lhe last several years, The number and size of supplemc'nllli stock and
opuon awards . howc""r. have skyrocketed, lcading to subSlantial increase' m lhe aggregate level
o f director compensalion. Are the'" incrcases in drrcctcr compensation Justified? Or are they
merely addilional "perks " to d irectors?
Opoo sjtlOn 10 jncen uw pay for

~1rc<:lQrS,

"ld,.pread lO ot her tynsd ICllon>. npc~lal\y

,n

"'hilt sroradic

to

Ill<: US. apocar} to be

thf Unned Kingdom In a report

eomn11S,ion~l!

by

lhe Secretary of State for Trade and Induslry and the Chancellor o f the Exchequer of lhe United
Ktngdom, Derek lli ggs advocates the u,c o f fees and discourages thc use of sha rcs and opuons
(Higgs, 2(03). In panicular. Higgs rccomme nd, thaI in addition to specify ing the ccnditions for
e xercise. the shares thus oblamcd should be held unhl one year aflcr thc non-exeeut,,·c director
lea"es the board. Th is recommendation ,s

ba,~d

on ,"forma tio n oblained from a , un 'ey o f UK

directors and c halmlcn .

7

Once a finn decides to offer HKe nti\'e pay to its

d"~to's.

n has to design an effec!tve

package that o tters tncenuve s. Ilow can firms !.>est Implement mcent lve pay for directors? In the
following discussion, we idenlify key ;mplemenlallOn Issue.' concernmg the pJra mctcrs of the
In general. these

compensJtion package.

i ssu~s

pen . in to tile form of

ct>nditions for the award and the restn ctions Imposcd on the

th~

.ward. the pre·

.wa rd~es

l$.ru e #1: Opl;O" .'· or !iroch- ?

TIle kev to offerm g inc( ntiycs Iii to incr( .w a dirccwr's ownership exposu rc hy
mcluding

~quit y - baiied

comooncnts 10 thc comlx:mallOn pacb gc, Two main ways ,n which

finn s (lffer ;neenll ves are aw.rd, of iihar~s , nd stock opllons. In both cases. fi rms sho uld try 10
restrict the cash cut

proc~ss.

In

Ih~ , ' ii~

(If restrloled shares. dlfeolors ca n oc prohibited rrom

se lling tl,e shares before a eel1ain d. le, " hioh ma)-

Of

m3Y n(ll be relal ed

In the oa"" of 5Iock oplions. firm can reslnct resale and constram option

to

thc d ir..><:IOr's tc nurc.

e.~ercisc

by stipul.tlng a

long "eslI ng period.
Options and restricted shareii differ Ln Ihe" sensitIvity to firm pcrformllnce and hence In
their nsk levels. Restric ted sh.res offer . lower risk .nd reward pro file th. n opllons. WhIle
option ,-.Iues Ca n reaeh zero, shares are r. rely worthkw 11,u<, restricted sh.res often provide
grealer value to dircctor< th.n oplions when jinn perfonnance decl ine, .

In th" context,

restric ted sh.res .rc Ie." risky . lld provide greater reword to the d trc><:lors.
Stock options are more commonly U3ed In Incentive contrnclS . Their attrac tweness hes
In thclr Iew rage and the "bi lity to selcct thcrr exercise priec. I'i'st. options are
Instrum~-n l s.

Opt, on values can increase dramJtlc.l ly In percent.ge

asset increases in value

Thus

d,,~etors

are

glv~n

t~l11lS wh~n

I~veraged

the underlying

the opportunity tQ Increase theIr wealth

dram' lIe. lly by working to ,nae.", share prices. Second, Smce opllons arc granted wIth . fixed
~xe1\: i "" pr ie~, th~y

o ffer the .d,,,ntage of downs ide risk if firm value docs not achieve a certain

threshold. If the share price is below the excrcI'" pnce, the optIOn is nCI valu.ble, ConSider a

8

finn that oft"rs lis dire ctors options m heu of a portlOn of the retainer. Here. the consequence of
poor perfo rmance would be a lower than usual remuneration. Thus, by setting appropria te leveh
of the exerd se pne e. fimlS can proVIde thdr directors with powerful Incenllves .

Iss"e #2:

r" Gil'e '''cem;,·c,' If." If BI)"".' l)r N m ?

WaITen Suffcn. m hi. 1994 annua l letter to shareho lders of S erh lm e HJ1h,,',ay Inc"
"'ntes "' Ironically, the rhetoric about options frequently descr ibes them as desi",blc because they
put mana!.'Crs and owners in the same fmanclal boat. In reality. the boats arc far different. No
owner has ever escaped the burden of capita l costs, whereas a holder of a fixed-price option
bears no capital costs a t all , An owner muSt weIgh upside potent ial agaInst downside ns k; an
option holde r has no do"midc (Cunn ingham, 20(1)," Implicil in Bilftet' s crit icism is tho fact
that managers do not bear eapnal costs lx.'<:a usc they arc gl"en options (or sharn ) wnho ut
reqUiring a monetary .acnfiee, The same critICIsm also applies to proVIdingdlrc-<;tors WIth shares
or options . To allevlale lh,s concern, finns should Impose capital costs by reqlllnng dIrector. to
purchase these mstrumcnts with thelr personal funds, Alternatively, finns can also encoumge
directors to "'bUY" eq uity_ba ...d incenllves by

g,,~ng

up a portIon of their casb retamer. That " .

f,nns call pay dlr cclors wllh lI1CenllVes Ln !reu of thc annual cash retainer. By taking these actio",
firms can prevent the" dire ctor lncent" .., comp,:nsatlon from assumIng a bonus-like form.
Ho we'-er, there is another con"derallon thai argues for a bonus-like structure for d,reclOr
mcenti vc

compensatio n.

Like

manager)al

compensallon.

slm uliaru:ously conta m both incentl"e and reward compone nts

dll"tC19r

eOJTll)(:n satjon

can

Wh,le ineenti"c compo nents

compensate d"c-ctors for fUlure pcrfoml ance. ,""ward components compensale directors for past
perfonnance.

The bla"kct proviSlOn of OpILO", and restricted shares, 'lTC SpcCtlve of pasl

pcrforma" ce proVIde IllcennveS lO Improve fUlure performa nce but do not reward dlrc<:tor ror
past perfonnance achie vement , Arb'\lably. a reward component in the compensatIOn package
may provide equ ally Imponant alrgnmcnl of director incentives for two rea sons.

First. the

s

reward may seC','e as a periodic Slgnalmg or feedbac k IlIechamsm to re,nforee desirable

I

performance behavior and thus elicit higher levels o f such behavior leading to improved futurc

I

perfOMnance (Luthans , 1999)

~econd ,

by prov Ldmg addl1lOnal shares or opuons for pa>.!

performance, the leve l of mcentl"" also rises Thus, the re is an imphcll eorrela llon between the
reward and meenUve co mponents
Reward compo nent s can be hU11t Imo the compensatIon package by vary ing thc conditIon
m whIch LIlcenm'e awards are granted. For mstance. the awards of opnons Or shares co uld be
eonungent on metncs Ihat relate to past performance such as (3) I'nor year stock pnce
performance (b) Pnor year Earnmgs per Share (EI'S) (c) Prior year Return on Equl1y (ROE) and
(d) Pnor year cash flow metrics such as Earnings Before Interes!. Taxes. Deprec lJtion and
Amol1ization (EBr r DA). Since a reward component pays directors for past performa nce, such a
component would ge nerally nOi require a tradeoff m the cash rel. iner. In thIS com ext, d"ector
compensation can take the fla\'o r of a bonus:
/."$/le #J : Setll

C/<?Il'

Object;I'c ofAIII,;n;"1f Il S ;gIJ iji cotlt Le"c/ of O"'/la.,lJip

Incemive compensa tion for d,reotors " . lfUeturally dlfferem from that for managers,
Managellle nt compensation IS scI at hIgh lncls

In

the absolute as well as relative senSe. Annua l

mco llle for 3 manage r IS lypic ally a Slgnlfi cant fmcm", o f hIS we.lth. In comrast, " trC\: tor
compensauon is reblL"e ly modest. Most Jm:c!Ors arc either retired Or re tIring s.:n ior ex<cutl\'' '
from large publIC compame . (Fern •. fOl1hcommg). Bocau>e of theIr work hIstory, these duec to, S
arC likel y to have accumu lated a slgmfl<anl k,'c! "f wealth. Also, eorporale " ircetors Can
diver 5\fy their mcome sITeam by servmg on mulup le boar"s, Thus, a "i reetor's eompe" s.tion
from . pal1icul.r ftrm is neither a brge portion of hIS overall wealth nOr is it a large fraction of
his overall income.
For these reasons, it is especi.lIy import.nt to p.y heed to the re<:o mmendal;ons of
Jensen and Ihc NACD an" ".Slgn contracts that

w jl]

>erve to .ccumulate S1gn Lfic.m equity

posn,ons o\' er time

Cnn:;equently, veslIng period' and restrictions on the ... Ie of equny are

Important components of the compensation plan.
-uesr Prac tices" for I)esigning l) ireclO r In ccm" 'e Pal'
Based On the above d ':;l:USS Lon . we can summanze the beSt pn~ctiecs governing the
dcsl!,'ll o f an mccnnv c contrac t for d irectors a:;; follows '

1. An effective plan should provide a majority of lhe pay wnh eqmty-ba'ed
in:;;trurnents such as stocks and sloc l opllo ns.
directors should nOi he u, ed as an excuse

Bm ineent",c compcn!illtlon 10
to

increase ["tal compensatIon

substantially and unconditIOnally. At least $Orne poninn of the incentive pay should
be in licu Of lh,' cash retainer,
2, Thc goal of prOVIding stock related eompe nsalton should be 10 accumulate
~ ubstanl ia l

"'l uny exposure.

WhIle this Can be achic"cd SImply by reqUiring

d treelOrs tn mvest the" eXlSlLng weallh m company ,hares, a more pract,cal
alternative is 10 ensure that (aJ a nnual award s o f , hares nr nptinns arc , ubstantlal and
(bJ dirc"Clor;; are proh lb,ted from reducmg thClr cxposure by selling the" shares.
3 , Inctnllve eompcnsollon sho uld crcalC inccntives for fUlure pcrfom>ance
enhanecmem as wcll as prOVIde reInforcement for past performance aehie,·emen!.
To ach,evc rbcsc purpose s. firms should var)" lhe amount of lhe grant based no
curre nt Or past performance 00 as to link mccntive a wards to paSl perfom'anee
aeh ie,."ment.
Are ·'Ues t Practic es" Followed ?
We now re pon on 289 dtrector mccOli,'c contracts adopted durm 8 19 88 _1998. Our data
arc derived from Gerety (200 I), who study stock price "'actinns 10 the adoptIon of dtrt:ctor
mccntivc plans. The sample covers 11 years and repr.sents lhe intlial

c.~p<:ricnce

of firms that

providc ineenti,·c pay l'or direct ors. \\,'e focus on two important aspecls of these plans ; the nature

II

of the equ ity-ba sed mstrument used and whet her the mccntrve is gravy_like on that It does not
rcqurrc tradeoff o f an existing retainer. We ident ify plans that solely use op tions. restricted
shar es or (unrestneted) stoc k awards and find that the majonty of the plans (152 of 289) use
solely op tions r"r the Incen tive co mpone nt. Th e typ,cal oplioo plan entails an annual grant of
opt,ons on 1.000 s hares w,th an exercise price equal to the preva ,ling share pn ce: tbe "est ing
period is typic ally 0-4 years: the maturny is typ ically 10 year< The number of re stncled share s
and stock award plans are 4? and J I respect " 'e1y
TAKEINTABLE J
We also rcpo n on thc number of grJ"}' p lans, Wc lind that moSt plans 1222 QUt o f 289)
providc incentive awa rds as ··...ravy'· in add ilion 10 nist in... cash eompc n:>a tion, In these plans,
the directors are n01 req uired to give up any of lheir curren t pay to receive the incco1i,'c awards .
As we have discussed previously,

dir~tor

com pensat ion can lake on a "bonliS" tla vc r if Incentive

a"'ard s are cont ingent on ach LC\'cmcnt of paSt pcrfonnance goals . Howc "cr , wc lind Ihat almost
nonc of these plans tlnk lhe a"'a rd, to pasl liml perfonnancc. Th us, we ca ll these gra"y plans ,
Earli er, we had note d that Ihc le'-ct of dlrcctor co mpensauon has risen ," reCent t,me , . Clcurly,
these gravy plans h"vc con1ribut e<.! to this mereaSi:.
The above issues are best hlghloghted by two exa mples; GE and Handy & Hannan. The
1989 GE plan emly satisfies $Orne of thc req uire ments for an effective paeh ge,

The

shon comm gs o f the GE ptan are as folio"". I'm;t. the sioc k opllon component co" crin g 1,500
share > does nol domm ale the annual eash rela iner and meeting fees . In fact, the optlon grant IS
made "'itho ut an y red uctIOn in the CX1Stlllg dircctor cOmpensatIOn , Th us, even if the opt,on s are
wor thles s, dircctors wou ld benc lit sub stan lially from the olhcr cash compone ntl of lhe
compensatIOn package, Seco nd. the vesting schedule for the OptiOnS >s inadequ ate on that " faits
to erea te a long-term exposu re to corporate equIty ho lding, TI,c GE plan all ows directors

to

exercise Op!IOn grants 1Il four equa l armualmstallments and once the opHons are exe rclsed . there

are no further restrictions on the sale of stock, A director who wishes to mmirmze h,s expos ure
to GE equity cao exercISe whene"er possible and lITlInediatdy sell the shares obtained , We
calc ulate that, at the mmmmm, thlS suategy w1l l expose the director to no more tha" ),750 shares
In

the option contract.
The 1990 Handy & liannan plan IS pamc ularly egregio us and lade n w,th gravy . Th"

plan o ffers options with a "" tional value of $12,000 ,,'hile maint"ininll Ihe d irector's cash
relam,1' of S24JlOO. The plan Irn,refore mcreases dIrector eompcnsahon by 50%. Further. the
opt,ons carry a low e;<ere;se price of $1 comparod

to

Ihe stock price of S13.50. Thus. these

optIOns ha"c "" intd nsic value (I.e., the "aluc if exerclScd today) of approxlrnatdy 50% ot" the
annual retainer. The fact that these options arc ,,,,Iuable m almosl all circums tances, unless the
Slock price drops to belo w a dollar, .hould be a poor Slgnal to shareho lders and ,n' llIUlional
m\'cstors.
In lil;ht o f this evide"ce. a vahd qucsHon lS whelhcr dIrector effort and performa nce has
correspo ndingly increased In recent ycar,. Given that the vast majority o f firms use incenrtve
compens.u ion as all addition to d irector ca, h compensatlon, one would hope 10 observe that
d irector perfommncc has illcreascd.

Otherwise. the label 'g mvy' remains dcscript ,ve and

accurate. One oositl" " de, domTh:1I1 " that the numher of gravy plans IS dcereasmg 10 reccnt
~

For cxamp le, if onCcons,dcrs the most recent 4 years, 1995-1998, one obse" 'es a slightly

lo wer incidence of gra"y plans (72 .4% or 89 of 123) than m the flf" 4 ycar period . 1988-1991
(857% or72of &4) ,
Wha t uoes tile futu n hold'!
The move

to

offcnng lneerlh"C pay 10 directors is well under way and irreversible. All

the ,mportant eonShtucntSmacademtctans, busmess leaders. managers . "' veSlors and portfoho
managers-c-a re supponi ve of thiS mov'ement , We nOlc that the first pan o f this rcvol uuon is now

IJ

onc~ntive

comp lcte with a vast majonty of US firms now having an

plan m place . The pace of

incent ive plan adoptions has been quite rnpid, with most of the adoptIons occurri ng on the 19905.

Our 'tudy of the firl l generation mceml\"l; plan. for dlRy tOrs md,cates lhal most plan,
are

f1aw~d

They are

~xces<lvely

~vcn

bonus -like and provide rew ards

for poor pcr fonnance.

They have served to me-case director compensa tion SIgnIficantly . An lrnpama l observer IS left
wondering whether the
alignment

betw ~~n d,,~ otors

Gra~f

such as

obj~ct

of tho ~xoroi,e is to

and

,har~holdcr,.

CI)·sta1. have now

start~d

mcreas~

d,,""tor payor to increasc

Influemla l ent ies o f

paying atte ntion to tho

compensatIon,

manag~"a l

~qua l ly

mcenhv~

Impona nt i$Sue of

d,rector compensation.
We do, however. note some positive trends in
sman but

not~wortby

dir~clOrs

tn make monetary

lh~

design of these cotltraet'_ We note a

convergence toward the ,deal contract.
sacrif.c~s

to rece Ive valuable

Mor~

and

mor~

firms

ar~ r~qui"ng

~qu ity-bas~d instrurn~ntS

sucb as

OptiOns . So me f,nns are e'-en makmg awards cond ll1onal on prIOr performance. Also. there tS an
mcreasing sens itivity toward the

n~~d

to

mc reas~

share

own~rshlp

of

d"eClor~

Impostng constraints on the IiqutdatlOn of lhe equity instruments. Fioally, In a

Qve r

tim~

di r~ct rtsrons~

by
to

Jensen' s ca ll, we a re see ing firms dramat ically increase the proportion of cquit}-bascd
compensation to overall director compensamm: thIS IS
as

D~H

~spe c ial1y

and Yahoo where the proportion is close to l OO"A Our

true for technology finns such

a ss~ss"",m

IS that

of the revol ution is und~r way but has quite a way to go before ItS completion.

th~ s~cond

pan
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T oh le 1
I' lo n C ha r acttr istics By Yea r o f P roposa l, 19 88 -19 98

I

Charaoterlstics for 289 ~q u L1y-based compensa tIon pions fOf non-executlvc directors. Deferred
compensation plans are nOl consid.. ~d 10 b<' mcent",,, compensa llOn plans. A gravy plan IS a
plan Ihat provIdes d Lrectors with addmonal equity-based compl.'nS<lllOn wrtbcut requ inng tmdeotT
10 annual reta;ncr. Opuon plan' arc plans thai 1O,-olvc the uSC of optIons, A rnajonry ( 143) of
the 152 opt Ion plans provides dneetors wilh pen<xhc ann ual awards of stock options ralher than
a one·t; me award. A restricted share plan md Lcatl's either a f"mal restric ted stock plan or an
incent ive plan involving the use of resale-restricted shares , Stock a"'"ard plans are plans that
Irtvolvc the use of eommon sloch . t>lL~ed plans have both opnon amI shan:: compo nents.
DiSl dil ut ion by Types of 1" ce nlive Awa rd
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Th e DCI;igl1 of II1 <:el1 ti,'e C om pens at iol1 for Di r eClO r s
Exe cut ive S um ma ry
In 1989, the board of General Electric Corporati<;111 (GEl vOled I" "ffer stock "pitons to
liS non-.:xccutLW dLrectors. GE was in tlK: vanguard of the move 10 otter equity-based incentIve
compensation to directors. Today. we find that most large US firms havc Ionc wed GE's lead
We e.~p 1am this phrnom enon by summarizing arguments frrun academicians and praCl iuoners.
The most eloquent prollOnet\t for incentLw pay IS MIchael Jensen who argues for
substantial (>SI OO.OOO) ownership exposure by directors and for such own ership to rise over
tllrn:. Addition.lly. Jensen calls for at least part of this own ership to be paid using the personal
funds of d,rcctors. Such a conceptual framework for director pay also linds supports hum the
Nahonal Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).
Although the prevailing , \,ltwentional wisdom is strongly sUPpo"ivc, thc," is a "alid
concern that firms 100 often des'gIl these eompcnsatlOn arrangements ineffectively. provldmg
'payoffs' to the directors that would increase their compensation regardless of fmn performance,
n us has led noted ,n n,s of uecutlv" , 0mpt'l1,atTOn soch as Graef Crystal to focus On dlreetor
compensation and qll"st;on II' h"thcr directo rs are "aming th" it 'kccp' ,
We tdcntdy three Important Issues regardIng the dCSLgn of dire, tor tn,ent""C
compensation arrangements. First.

tinn ~

need 10 decide on II'hether 10 use options or shares_We

show thal the risk·rcward profIle dIffer. ror thcse twO altemat;"cs lIIld that options olTer a more
S'-'TI,;ti"e profIle. Options also allow deSIgn flexibllny in thal th, excrcise pn, c can be tailored to
n eate an optimal amount of tn, ent,,·es. Second. finns need to detcrmme the proportion of the
compensation attributable to past perfonnanee (b<.>nus eompon"n\) and the proport ion attrib utable
to future pcrfonnanee (ineentive ,omponent), Superfielally it might appear ", though the lalter
must dominate, but there is a case 10 be made for a bonus component: for example. f,nns may
vary the n" mber of share, or options to relleet past performance. Third. and perhaps most

importamly, firn,s shou ld constraIn and prevent directors from reducing their o""ersh,p
exposure. Thil can be achlevw by using 10tlger ,'estmg periods or by speclfymg nnm rnum levels
of exposure: additIonally. firms should P'OhLbll directors from USLng financIal derlvatw es to
decrease lheir o""ersh;p eXjlOSure
Finally, we analyLe 289 ;nSlances of ftnns offerLng incenn>'c pay 10 dnectors 10
understa nd whether aClual pmclice conforms 10 the general prine' pies Identified above , We foc us
on three importan t aspects of these plans, the usc of options v.... shares. whether the eqully award
reqUlres giving up a part of the existin g rctemer and whether the amount oflhe award depends on
past performance , We rmd that lhe maJ0rlly of the plans (1 52 o£189) usc only oplLons. We also
report on the numt>l:r of gravy plans where ",e etl1 i"e awards are ladled on top of the usual
' elamer, We find lhal a supe,· maJorlly of the plans (122 o ut of289) fit lhlS category , Fmally.
we find thai almost none o f these plans link the awards 10 past IIrm performance.

r . board of dll'"CIOrS
2. d"eclOr pay
3. 'nttnll''C CompensatlOll
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